EMBEDDING PEACEBUILDING FRAMEWORKS IN POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES IN ZIMBABWE: A CASE FOR ESTABLISHING A PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND SOCIAL COHESION BOARD

Author: Dr Donwell Dube

Abstract

This paper examines the critical importance of sustaining peacebuilding frameworks within Zimbabwe's political and development programmes, particularly in light of the National Development Strategy 2 (NDS2), the recent expiry of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission's mandate in 2024, and escalating global instability. Drawing on the Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity frameworks as theoretical lenses, this study argues for the establishment of a permanent Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board under the Office of the President and Cabinet. Through comparative case study analysis of peacebuilding mechanisms in Rwanda, South Africa, and Kenya, this paper demonstrates that institutionalising peacebuilding within the highest echelons of governance ensures sustainable peace dividends, prevents conflict recurrence, and strengthens social cohesion. The analysis incorporates contemporary conflict dynamics including ongoing urban violence involving public transport operators, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and municipal authorities, demonstrating the urgent need for conflict-sensitive development interventions. The paper concludes that Zimbabwe's trajectory towards Vision 2030 and upper-middle-income status requires deliberate, sustained, and institutionalised peacebuilding efforts embedded across all development sectors.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, Conflict Sensitivity, Do No Harm, National Development Strategy 2, Zimbabwe, National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, Social Cohesion, Urban Conflict

1. Introduction

The imperative to embed peacebuilding frameworks within political and development programmes has never been more urgent for Zimbabwe. As the nation implements its National Development Strategy 2 (NDS2) 2026-2030 and aspires towards Vision 2030's goal of achieving upper-middle-income status, the nexus between sustainable development and sustained peace becomes increasingly evident (Government of Zimbabwe, 2025). However, Zimbabwe now faces a critical institutional vacuum following the expiry of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission's mandate in 2024, creating a perilous gap in the nation's peace architecture at precisely the moment when both global and domestic conflict dynamics are intensifying (NewsDay Zimbabwe, 2024). This institutional void emerges against the backdrop of deteriorating global peace and escalating urban conflicts that threaten to undermine the nation's development ambitions.

The Global Peace Index 2025 paints a sobering picture of global instability: world peace has deteriorated by 5.4 per cent over the past seventeen years, with 2024 recording the highest number of countries, seventeen in total, experiencing over 1,000 internal conflict deaths since 1999 (Vision of Humanity, 2025). Moreover, the number of conflicts resolved through peace agreements has plummeted from 23 per cent to merely 4 per cent (Countercurrents, 2025), underscoring a global deficit in peacebuilding capacity. Zimbabwe cannot afford complacency in this environment of what analysts term 'the great fragmentation,' where 87 countries deteriorated in peacefulness in 2024 alone (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024).

Domestically, the absence of a dedicated peacebuilding institution coincides with emerging conflict dynamics that demand systematic attention. Zimbabwe's urban centres are experiencing escalating violence involving public transport operators, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and municipal authorities, resulting in deaths, injuries, and destruction of property (Zimbabwe Shafaqna, 2024; allAfrica, 2024). These conflicts, rooted in competition for economic survival, regulatory enforcement failures, and governance deficits, exemplify how development challenges can rapidly transform into violent confrontations when conflict-sensitive frameworks are absent. Parliament has condemned the deadly consequences of police pursuits of pirate taxis, while transport operators engage in territorial turf wars that leave commuters caught in crossfire (New Zimbabwe, 2024; The Sunday Mail Zimbabwe, 2024).

This paper advances the argument that Zimbabwe must urgently establish a permanent Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board under the Office of the President and Cabinet to ensure that peacebuilding is not episodic but systematically embedded across all political and development interventions. Utilising the Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity frameworks as analytical tools, this study examines how development programmes can either exacerbate or mitigate conflict dynamics, and proposes institutional mechanisms to ensure the latter. The paper draws on international case studies from Rwanda, South Africa, and Kenya to demonstrate that permanent peacebuilding institutions positioned at the highest levels of government are essential for sustainable peace and development.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Do No Harm Framework

The Do No Harm framework, developed by Mary Anderson (1999), provides a critical lens for analysing how development and humanitarian interventions interact with conflict dynamics. At its core, the framework recognises that all interventions in conflict-affected contexts operate through two mechanisms: resource transfers, which include material goods, services, and training; and implicit ethical messages, which communicate who is worthy of assistance and what behaviours are rewarded (Anderson, 1999). These interventions inevitably interact with dividers, meaning factors that separate people and create tension, and connectors, referring to factors that bring people together across conflict lines.

In the Zimbabwean context, research has demonstrated the applicability of Do No Harm principles through various case studies. During the 2008 cholera outbreak intervention in Budiriro, Zimbabwe, adherence to neutrality and non-partisan assistance proved essential in a politically polarised environment marked by violence. The Do No Harm framework demands that development actors conduct conflict analysis to understand dividers and connectors within communities, analyse how resource transfers and implicit ethical messages interact with these dynamics, generate programme options that minimise harm and maximise peace potential, and test and redesign interventions based on ongoing monitoring of their conflict impacts. This systematic approach recognises that even well-intentioned development interventions can exacerbate tensions if they reinforce existing dividers, create new grievances through inequitable distribution, or send messages that reward particular groups while excluding others.

The framework's relevance extends beyond humanitarian emergencies to encompass all development programming. Infrastructure projects that provide employment or services to some communities while excluding others can deepen regional or ethnic divisions. Agricultural programmes that distribute inputs through partisan channels can transform farming into a politically divisive activity. Urban planning decisions that favour certain groups can generate resentment and conflict. The Do No Harm framework provides practical tools for anticipating and mitigating these risks through systematic conflict analysis integrated into programme design, implementation, and evaluation.

2.2 The Conflict Sensitivity Framework

Conflict sensitivity extends the Do No Harm principle by requiring that all development interventions systematically assess and address their potential impact on conflict dynamics throughout the programme cycle (International Alert, 2007). Conflict sensitivity comprises three interrelated elements that form a continuous cycle of analysis, adaptation, and action.

The first element involves understanding the context through comprehensive analysis of conflict dynamics, actors, causes, and trajectories. This requires moving beyond superficial understandings to grasp the historical roots of tensions, the economic and political interests that perpetuate conflict, the social identities that define groups, and the institutional weaknesses that allow violence to emerge. In Zimbabwe's case, this would encompass analysis of historical grievances dating to the liberation struggle and post-independence conflicts, contemporary political polarisation, economic inequalities that map onto regional and ethnic lines, and emerging urban conflicts around resources and livelihoods.

The second element focuses on understanding the interaction between development programmes and conflict contexts. This involves analysing how programmes affect conflict dynamics, either positively or negatively, and how conflict dynamics affect programme implementation and outcomes. A conflict-sensitive approach recognises that development interventions are never neutral; they redistribute resources, empower certain actors, shift power balances, and communicate values that interact with existing tensions. Simultaneously, conflict contexts shape which programmes can be implemented, who can participate, what risks exist, and what unintended consequences may emerge.

The third element requires acting on understanding by adapting programmes to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive contributions to peace. This goes beyond merely avoiding harm to actively seeking opportunities to strengthen connectors, bridge dividers, and address conflict drivers through development programming. Conflict-sensitive programming may involve adjusting targeting criteria to ensure inclusivity, modifying implementation modalities to prevent elite capture, incorporating dialogue and reconciliation components, or linking development initiatives to local conflict resolution mechanisms.

Research on Zimbabwe has emphasised the importance of context sensitivity in intervention programmes, demonstrating that programmes should be conflict-sensitive in order to 'do no harm,' particularly in respecting local structures, customs, and cultural contexts. Furthermore, the importance of community participation emerged as essential, with interventions needing to respect the structures and customs of communities rather than imposing external models that may conflict with local values or inadvertently favour particular.

These frameworks are particularly relevant for Zimbabwe's development trajectory under NDS2, which aims to strengthen social cohesion through a renewed social contract anchored on trust, dialogue, and shared national values (Government of Zimbabwe, 2025). Without systematic conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm approaches embedded across all NDS2 interventions, development programmes risk inadvertently exacerbating historical dividers related to political affiliation, ethnicity, region, and access to resources. The expiry of the NPRC's mandate without a successor institution means that Zimbabwe currently lacks the institutional capacity to ensure conflict sensitivity across government programmes, creating significant risks that development initiatives may fuel rather than mitigate tensions.

3. Background and Context

3.1 National Development Strategy 2 (NDS2) and Peacebuilding

Zimbabwe's National Development Strategy 2 covering the period 2026-2030 represents the nation's roadmap towards Vision 2030's aspiration of achieving an empowered upper-middle-income society. Among its ten national priorities, NDS2 explicitly recognises the importance of good governance and security, with a commitment to consolidate unity, peace, and social cohesion through robust governance and security institutions (ZANU PF  2025). The strategy acknowledges that NDS2 will further strengthen social cohesion through a renewed social contract anchored on trust, dialogue, and shared national values (IPEC, 2025).

However, the articulation of peacebuilding within NDS2 remains largely aspirational, lacking concrete institutional mechanisms, dedicated budgets, and systematic integration across the strategy's other priorities including economic transformation, modernisation of infrastructure, food security, and devolution. The United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Zimbabwe covering 2022-2026 has noted that while NDS2 references social cohesion, national unity, peace and reconciliation, operationalising these concepts requires deliberate institutional architecture supported by adequate resources and clear accountability mechanisms (UNDP, 2023).

The challenge is that peacebuilding cannot be treated as a standalone pillar divorced from economic development, service delivery, or governance reform. Research demonstrates that development interventions themselves shape conflict dynamics in fundamental ways. In Zimbabwe's experience, the government's role as the champion of development has been severely compromised, leading to tension between the government and civil society (Author's knowledge base). This underscores that governance deficits and development failures can themselves become sources of conflict, creating a vicious cycle that undermines both peace and prosperity. When citizens perceive that development, resources are distributed along partisan lines, when infrastructure projects favour certain regions while neglecting others, or when economic opportunities are accessible only to politically connected elites, development itself becomes a driver of resentment and division rather than a foundation for shared prosperity.

NDS2's implementation occurs in a context where peacebuilding institutions have been weakened rather than strengthened. The expiry of the NPRC's mandate in 2024 without immediate successor arrangements means that Zimbabwe enters its most ambitious development phase in decades without dedicated institutional capacity to ensure conflict sensitivity, facilitate reconciliation, or coordinate peacebuilding across sectors. This represents a critical vulnerability that threatens the entire NDS2 framework, as development initiatives implemented without conflict-sensitive approaches may inadvertently exacerbate the very divisions they seek to overcome.

3.2 The Expiry of the NPRC Mandate: An Institutional Vacuum

The National Peace and Reconciliation Commission was established under sections 251-253 of Zimbabwe's 2013 Constitution with a constitutional mandate to ensure post-conflict justice, healing and reconciliation; develop programmes to promote national healing, unity and cohesion; and bring about sustainable peace (NPRC, 2024). The Commission's tenure came to an end in 2024 before fulfilling all its constitutional obligations. (NewsDay Zimbabwe, 2024).

The Human Rights Committee, in reviewing Zimbabwe's compliance with international human rights obligations, noted that the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission had closed but had not completed its mandate, due to financial restraints imposed throughout its operational period (OHCHR, 2025).

The Zimbabwe Herald reported that following the expiry of the tenure of the Justice Selo Nare-led commission, the NPRC is set to be reconstituted, raising critical questions about institutional continuity, resource allocation, and political commitment to peacebuilding (Herald, 2024; Zimbabwe Situation, 2024). However, as of early 2025, no concrete steps towards reconstitution have been announced, leaving Zimbabwe without functional peacebuilding infrastructure for the first time since the 2013 Constitution's adoption.

The institutional vacuum created by the NPRC's closure carries profound implications for Zimbabwe's peace and development trajectory. First, there is loss of institutional memory and expertise that had been accumulated over the decade of the Commission's operations, including conflict analysis capacity, community reconciliation methodologies, and stakeholder relationships built painstakingly over years. Second, discontinuity in peacebuilding programmes means that community-level reconciliation processes initiated by the NPRC have been abandoned mid-stream, creating perceptions among victims that their suffering has been forgotten. Third, Zimbabwe now possesses weakened capacity to respond to emerging conflict dynamics, as evidenced by the escalating urban violence involving transport operators and law enforcement, which would have fallen within the NPRC's early warning and conflict prevention mandate.

 There is potential regression on national healing as victims of historical atrocities perceive abandonment of transitional justice commitments, potentially fuelling resentment and desire for revenge rather than reconciliation. The current institutional gap demonstrates that Zimbabwe has failed to internalise the lesson that peacebuilding requires permanent institutional homes rather than temporary, politically contingent arrangements.

3.3 Growing Global Instability and Regional Implications

Zimbabwe's peacebuilding imperative must be understood within the context of deteriorating global and regional peace. The Global Peace Index 2025 reveals that global peacefulness continues to decline and that many of the leading factors that precede major conflicts are higher than they have ever been (Vision of Humanity, 2025). Key findings paint a disturbing picture of a world becoming increasingly divided and conflict-prone.

The widening peace inequality shows that the 25 most peaceful countries became 1 per cent more peaceful compared to 2008, while the 25 least peaceful countries became 7.5 per cent less peaceful, suggesting a bifurcation of the global system into zones of stability and zones of chronic conflict (Economics and Peace, 2024). Seventeen countries recorded over 1,000 internal conflict deaths in 2024, representing the highest number since 1999 and indicating that internal conflicts rather than inter-state wars constitute the primary contemporary threat to peace. Eighty-seven countries deteriorated in peacefulness in 2024 compared to 74 that improved, demonstrating that the trend towards conflict is accelerating globally (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024). Most alarmingly, the number of conflicts ending through peace agreements fell from 23 per cent to 4 per cent, suggesting that contemporary conflicts are becoming more intractable and that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are losing effectiveness.

For Southern Africa, regional instability manifests through multiple channels that directly affect Zimbabwe's peace and development prospects. Insecurity in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, driven by violent extremism, has disrupted regional trade routes, generated refugee flows, and created opportunities for transnational criminal networks that destabilise neighbouring countries. Political tensions in South Africa, including xenophobic violence, service delivery protests, and concerns about electoral integrity, impact economic partnerships and create regional uncertainty that affects investor confidence across the Southern African Development Community region. Climate-induced resource conflicts are exacerbating food insecurity, as droughts and floods become more frequent and severe, generating competition over water, arable land, and grazing areas that can escalate into communal violence. Youth unemployment across the region, with millions of young people lacking meaningful economic opportunities, creates vulnerabilities for recruitment into violent extremism, organised crime, and political violence.

Zimbabwe's peace infrastructure must therefore be strengthened rather than weakened, capable of providing early warning and response to internal and external conflict risks through systematic monitoring of conflict indicators and rapid deployment of peacebuilding interventions before tensions escalate to violence. Cross-border peacebuilding in collaboration with regional mechanisms like the Southern African Development Community is essential, recognising that peace is increasingly a regional rather than purely national phenomenon. Building resilience against the climate-conflict nexus requires integrating peacebuilding into climate adaptation and natural resource management programmes, ensuring that responses to environmental challenges strengthen rather than undermine social cohesion. Countering violent extremism through community cohesion involves addressing the grievances, marginalisation, and lack of opportunity that make young people vulnerable to extremist recruitment, requiring development programmes that combine economic empowerment with values-based education and social inclusion.

The deteriorating global peace environment makes the absence of dedicated peacebuilding institutions in Zimbabwe particularly alarming. At precisely the moment when conflict risks are escalating globally and regionally, Zimbabwe has dismantled rather than strengthened its peace architecture, leaving the nation vulnerable to conflict contagion and ill-equipped to prevent the transformation of development challenges into violent confrontations.

3.4 Urban Conflicts: Transport Operators, Law Enforcement, and Municipal Authorities

Beyond historical and political conflicts, Zimbabwe's urban centres are experiencing a contemporary manifestation of conflict that exemplifies the urgent need for conflict-sensitive development approaches. Ongoing violence involving public transport operators, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and municipal authorities has resulted in deaths, injuries, destruction of property, and pervasive insecurity for commuters (allAfrica, 2024). These conflicts, rooted in the informal economy's struggle for survival, regulatory failures, and governance deficits, demonstrate how seemingly technical development issues around transport planning and law enforcement can rapidly escalate into deadly violence when conflict sensitivity is absent.

The nature of these conflicts is multi-faceted and deeply rooted in Zimbabwe's economic crisis and governance challenges. Public transport operators, including both registered commuter omnibus drivers and operators of pirate taxis locally known as mushikashika, compete fiercely for passengers in an environment of economic desperation where daily income determines survival for families. This competition has generated territorial turf wars in which operators violently defend particular routes and ranks against perceived encroachment by rivals, leading to assaults, destruction of vehicles, and intimidation of commuters who become trapped in the crossfire (The Sunday Mail Zimbabwe, 2024). Operators and their crews frequently engage in fierce competition tactics to secure passengers, leading to violent clashes and harassment of commuters who find themselves coerced onto particular vehicles through threats and intimidation (Zimbabwe Shafaqna, 2024).

Law enforcement responses to regulatory violations by transport operators have themselves become sources of deadly conflict. Parliament has condemned police over deadly pirate taxi pursuits, noting that Zimbabwe Republic Police officers have been involved in running battles with commuter omnibuses and pirate taxis, with these confrontations resulting in loss of lives as high-speed chases through crowded urban areas end in crashes that kill operators, passengers, and bystanders (New Zimbabwe, 2024). The Zimbabwe Republic Police has issued warnings about pirate taxi operators, including incidents where operators allegedly attacked police officers on patrol when they attempted to arrest drivers for regulatory violations, demonstrating the breakdown of respect for law enforcement and the willingness of desperate operators to use violence to protect their livelihoods (Facebook ZRP Warning, 2024).

The Zimbabwe Republic Police has warned the public not to use mushikashika taxis, stating that these pirate taxis are being used by criminals to steal from members of the public, adding a criminal dimension to what began as conflicts over regulatory compliance and territorial control (Facebook ZRP Warning, 2024). In response to these escalating tensions, the Zimbabwe Republic Police has banned all officers from engaging in the passenger transport business following an internal inquiry that uncovered police involvement in the very sector they are tasked with regulating, creating obvious conflicts of interest that undermine enforcement credibility (The Zimbabwean, 2025). Police have ordered all officers to stop operating kombis and other public service vehicles, recognising that such involvement constitutes a conflict of interest that delegitimises law enforcement and fuels perceptions of corruption and favouritism (Daily News Zimbabwe, 2024).

Municipal authorities have attempted to address the chaos through regulatory interventions that have themselves generated conflict. Harare City has announced plans to ban commuter omnibuses and pirate taxis within the next three years as part of efforts to transform the city, but these plans have been met with resistance from operators who see their livelihoods threatened and who lack alternative economic opportunities (Facebook Harare City, 2024). The police have targeted more than 13,500 unregistered kombis and pirate taxis as part of enforcement campaigns, but the scale of unregistered operations demonstrates the ineffectiveness of purely punitive approaches that fail to address the underlying economic drivers of informality (The Herald, 2024).

Violent clashes in Zimbabwe have left a number of people injured following confrontations between police, commuter omnibus operators, and vendors, with these incidents occurring after Harare City Council attempted to enforce regulations that operators and informal traders perceived as threatening their survival (allAfrica, 2024). Public transport chaos characterised by violence, speeding, and disregard for passenger safety has created an environment where commuters face daily risks, with many innocent lives lost due to the failure to address these conflicts through dialogue, regulation reform, and economic alternatives rather than purely punitive enforcement (Zimbabwe Shafaqna, 2024).

These urban transport conflicts illustrate several critical lessons for conflict-sensitive development. First, they demonstrate that economic desperation transforms regulatory issues into life-and-death struggles, as operators who lack alternative livelihoods will use violence to protect their ability to earn income, meaning that enforcement without economic alternatives simply escalates conflict. Second, they show that state legitimacy depends on both effectiveness and fairness, as police involvement in the transport sector undermines enforcement credibility while heavy-handed tactics generate resentment and resistance rather than compliance. Third, they reveal that urban planning and transport policy are not merely technical matters but deeply political and conflict-sensitive issues, as decisions about who can operate where, which routes are formalised, and how enforcement occurs distribute resources and opportunities in ways that create winners and losers.

Fourth, they illustrate that absence of dialogue mechanisms allows tensions to escalate to violence, as operators, police, municipal authorities, and commuters lack forums for negotiating competing interests and developing mutually acceptable solutions. Fifth, they demonstrate the interconnection between development challenges and peace, as the failure to create formal employment opportunities drives informality, which generates regulatory conflicts, which escalate to violence, which undermines economic activity and creates pervasive insecurity. Had the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission been functioning with adequate capacity, these urban conflicts would have fallen within its early warning and conflict prevention mandate, potentially enabling dialogue-based interventions before violence claimed lives and destroyed property.

The transport sector conflicts represent a microcosm of Zimbabwe's broader development challenges and the urgent need for conflict-sensitive approaches. They show that without systematic conflict analysis, development and governance interventions can inadvertently trigger violence, and without dedicated peacebuilding institutions capable of facilitating dialogue and mediating disputes, conflicts that begin as manageable tensions escalate into deadly confrontations. The establishment of a permanent Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board with capacity to address both historical grievances and contemporary conflicts like those in the transport sector is essential if Zimbabwe is to achieve the peaceful and prosperous society envisioned in Vision 2030.

4. Analysis: Embedding Peacebuilding Through Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity

4.1 Current Development Programmes and Conflict Dynamics

Zimbabwe's development programmes under NDS2 span agriculture, mining, manufacturing, infrastructure, health, education, and devolution. Each of these sectors intersects with potential conflict dynamics that must be systematically understood and addressed through conflict-sensitive programming informed by Do No Harm principles.

In the agriculture and land sector, the land reform programme remains a divisive historical issue that continues to shape political identities and inter-group relations. Agricultural development interventions must be conflict-sensitive to avoid reinforcing perceptions of favouritism based on political affiliation or ethnicity, recognising that decisions about who receives inputs, extension services, irrigation support, and mechanisation assistance communicate powerful messages about citizenship and belonging. The Do No Harm framework would require analysing how agricultural programmes affect dividers such as political affiliation, ethnicity, generational tensions between those who participated in the liberation struggle and younger Zimbabweans, and urban-rural divisions, while identifying opportunities to strengthen connectors such as farmer cooperatives that bring together diverse members, market systems that create interdependencies, and shared water sources that require collaborative management. Agricultural programmes that provide support exclusively to beneficiaries of land reform without addressing the needs of remaining commercial farmers, communal farmers, or displaced former workers risk deepening divisions, while inclusive programmes that support productivity regardless of farm size or political affiliation can serve as connectors.

The mining and natural resources sector presents particularly acute conflict risks given the economic stakes involved and the history of violence around artisanal mining sites. Artisanal mining, particularly gold panning, has generated violent conflicts between communities and government authorities seeking to enforce regulations, between artisanal miners and commercial mining companies claiming exclusive rights to concessions, and within communities between those benefiting from mining and those experiencing environmental degradation without compensation. Development programmes promoting formalisation of artisanal mining must understand these complex dynamics and design interventions that address legitimate livelihood concerns while promoting environmental sustainability and equitable benefit-sharing. Conflict-insensitive approaches that criminalise artisanal miners without providing alternative livelihoods simply drive mining further underground and generate resentment against state authority, while approaches that engage miners in dialogue about formalisation pathways, provide skills training, and ensure fair revenue-sharing can transform mining from a conflict driver into a connector that supports local development.

The devolution and local governance priority within NDS2 offers significant peacebuilding potential by bringing decision-making closer to communities and enabling locally appropriate solutions to development challenges. However, without conflict sensitivity, devolution can exacerbate ethnic tensions by enabling majorities to dominate minorities at local levels, create new elite capture dynamics as local power brokers monopolise devolved resources and authorities, or generate inter-provincial competition for resources that takes on ethnic or regional dimensions. Conflict-sensitive devolution requires deliberate mechanisms for inclusive participation that ensure marginalised groups have voice in local governance, transparent resource allocation formulae that are perceived as fair and prevent perceptions of favouritism, conflict resolution mechanisms embedded at local levels capable of addressing disputes before they escalate, and capacity building for local authorities in conflict-sensitive governance. Devolution implemented with conflict sensitivity can strengthen national unity by demonstrating that the state serves all citizens regardless of location or identity, while devolution implemented without such sensitivity risks fragmenting national cohesion.

Service delivery represents another critical domain where conflict sensitivity is essential. Research has demonstrated that service delivery failures can themselves generate conflict by undermining state legitimacy, creating perceptions of abandonment or discrimination, and fuelling grievances that political entrepreneurs can mobilise. Conflict-sensitive service delivery requires understanding political dynamics to ensure that assistance is genuinely non-partisan rather than inadvertently favouring particular constituencies, ensuring equitable geographic distribution so that all regions receive attention proportionate to need rather than political influence, building state-society trust by delivering services through collaborative partnerships that strengthen rather than bypass government systems, and communicating clearly about service standards and targeting criteria to prevent perceptions of discrimination or favouritism.

The transport sector conflicts discussed earlier illustrate the consequences of development interventions implemented without conflict sensitivity. Urban transport policy that focuses exclusively on regulatory enforcement without addressing the underlying economic drivers of informality predictably generates violent resistance from operators fighting for survival. Municipal planning that designates certain areas for formal transport operations while criminalising others creates territorial conflicts as operators compete for access to lucrative routes. Law enforcement that relies on heavy-handed tactics including high-speed pursuits through crowded areas escalates rather than resolves conflicts, resulting in deaths that fuel public anger against authorities. A conflict-sensitive approach to urban transport would begin with conflict analysis to understand the economic desperation driving informality, the territorial dynamics shaping operator conflicts, and the local governance failures that have allowed the current chaos to emerge. It would recognise transport operators as stakeholders whose interests and concerns must be understood rather than merely as targets for enforcement. It would design regulatory reforms through participatory processes that give operators voice in shaping systems they will be expected to follow. It would provide economic alternatives including skills training and access to credit for those unable to continue in transport. It would establish dialogue mechanisms bringing together operators, police, municipal authorities, and commuters to negotiate shared solutions rather than imposing top-down directives that lack legitimacy.

4.2 Application of Do No Harm Principles

Applying the Do No Harm framework systematically across NDS2 interventions requires institutionalising four interrelated processes throughout the programme cycle from design through implementation to evaluation and adaptation.

First, every NDS2 programme should begin with conflict analysis identifying the dividers and connectors that characterise the intervention context. Dividers in the Zimbabwean context include political affiliation that shapes access to opportunities and creates pervasive distrust, regional divisions between urban and rural areas and between provinces that compete for infrastructure investment and development attention, generational tensions between older citizens who participated in the liberation struggle and younger Zimbabweans who feel excluded from the nationalist narrative and economic opportunities, gender inequalities that marginalise women from decision-making and economic participation, and economic class divisions between elites and the masses struggling in informal economies. Connectors that can be strengthened through conflict-sensitive programming include national identity as Zimbabweans with shared history and aspirations that transcends narrower identities, cultural values particularly ubuntu or unhu emphasising interconnection and mutual responsibility, religious networks that bring together diverse communities in shared worship and service, market systems that create economic interdependencies across political and ethnic lines, sports and cultural activities that provide non-political spaces for interaction and collaboration, and shared experiences of economic hardship that create common ground across divides.

Second, programmes must analyse resource transfers, examining the material resources being provided including infrastructure, training, inputs, employment, and services, and assess how these distributions interact with conflict dynamics. Geographic distribution must be examined to determine whether resources reinforce existing regional inequalities by concentrating investment in already advantaged areas or promote equity by prioritising historically marginalised regions. Beneficiary selection criteria require scrutiny to ensure they are transparent, applied consistently, and perceived as fair rather than partisan, recognising that perceptions of favouritism can undermine development impact even when objective criteria exist. Economic impacts must be assessed to determine whether programmes create new dependencies that give political patrons leverage over beneficiaries or empower sustainable livelihoods that provide independence from political control. In Zimbabwe's experience during the cholera intervention, the importance of neutrality was demonstrated through the finding that the desire to 'do no harm' required ensuring that assistance was non-partisan in a politically polarised environment where providing aid through partisan channels would have fuelled conflict rather than serving humanitarian needs (Author's knowledge base).

Programmes should establish monitoring and evaluation systems that track conflict impacts alongside development outcomes, enabling programme redesign based on evidence of how interventions are affecting peace and conflict. Monitoring should track unintended conflict impacts including increased tensions between communities receiving different levels of assistance, exclusion of particular groups from programme benefits creating grievances, and emerging conflicts over resources or opportunities created by programmes. Simultaneously, monitoring should identify emerging peace opportunities including new collaborations between previously antagonistic groups facilitated by programme activities, dialogue spaces created through programme forums that enable communication across divides, and shifts in attitudes as joint work breaks down stereotypes and builds relationships. Based on this monitoring, programmes must be willing to adapt implementation to maximise connectors and minimise dividers, adjusting targeting to address exclusion, modifying implementation modalities that inadvertently fuel tensions, and incorporating peacebuilding components when conflict risks are identified.

The application of Do No Harm principles requires institutional capacity and commitment that currently does not exist in Zimbabwe following the NPRC's closure. Without a dedicated institution responsible for conflict sensitivity across government, individual ministries and implementing agencies lack guidance, tools, and accountability mechanisms to ensure that development programmes do no harm. Line ministries focused on sectoral objectives including agricultural production targets, infrastructure completion deadlines, or service delivery metrics have neither incentives nor capacity to conduct systematic conflict analysis or modify programmes based on peace impacts. The result is that development programmes proceed without conflict sensitivity, inadvertently fuelling the very tensions and divisions that undermine their own effectiveness and Zimbabwe's broader development trajectory.

5. Case Studies: International Experiences

5.1 Rwanda: National Unity and Reconciliation Commission

Following the 1994 genocide that claimed approximately 800,000 lives and shattered Rwandan society, the government established the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission as a permanent statutory body under the Office of the President in 1999. The decision to create a permanent rather than time-bound institution reflected recognition that reconciliation following mass atrocity cannot be achieved within a fixed timeline but requires sustained, generational effort to transform relationships, rebuild trust, and construct shared national identity from the ruins of genocidal division.

The institutional design of Rwanda's National Unity and Reconciliation Commission positions it as a permanent statutory commission not subject to sunset clauses, ensuring that peacebuilding remains a national priority regardless of political transitions or competing demands on government attention. Location in the presidency rather than in a line ministry signals the highest political commitment to reconciliation and enables the Commission to coordinate peacebuilding across all government sectors, ensuring that unity and reconciliation considerations shape economic planning, education policy, justice sector reforms, and infrastructure development. The Commission holds a broad mandate to promote unity, reconciliation, and social cohesion through whatever means prove effective, providing flexibility to develop innovative approaches responsive to evolving needs rather than being constrained by narrowly defined functions. Critically, the Commission possesses authority to coordinate peacebuilding across all government sectors, requiring line ministries to demonstrate how their programmes contribute to national unity and to adapt sectoral plans when they risk undermining reconciliation.

The Commission's programmes have been comprehensive, addressing both justice for past atrocities and construction of shared future identity. Community-based Gacaca courts combined elements of traditional justice with modern legal frameworks, enabling community participation in accountability processes while avoiding the delays and expense of conventional trials for hundreds of thousands of genocide suspects. Ingando civic education camps bring together Rwandans from diverse backgrounds for intensive periods of shared learning about history, rights and responsibilities, and national development priorities, fostering understanding and relationships across previous divides. The Ndi Umunyarwanda campaign, translating as "I am Rwandan," promotes national identity transcending ethnic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, emphasising shared citizenship and common destiny rather than the ethnic classifications that underpinned genocide. Integration of peace education throughout the national curriculum ensures that future generations learn conflict resolution skills, understand the dangers of prejudice and dehumanisation, and embrace values of tolerance and inclusion from early childhood.

Rwanda's National Unity and Reconciliation Index, a quantitative measurement tool tracking progress on reconciliation, improved from 71.7 per cent in 2010 to 92.5 per cent in 2020, demonstrating measurable progress in social cohesion across indicators including inter-group trust, perceptions of fairness, feelings of safety, and willingness to cooperate across previous divides (NURC, 2020). Economic growth averaged 7.5 per cent annually over two decades, suggesting that peace dividends include investor confidence attracted by stability, productive capacity no longer consumed by conflict, and government effectiveness enhanced by social cohesion (World Bank, 2023).

Lessons from Rwanda's experience that inform recommendations for Zimbabwe include recognition that permanence matters, as time-bound commissions lack the sustained engagement required for deep reconciliation, while permanent institutions signal enduring commitment and enable long-term relationship building that cannot be rushed. Presidential location of peacebuilding institutions signals that reconciliation is a top national priority and enables cross-sectoral coordination ensuring that all government programmes contribute to rather than undermine social cohesion. Community engagement proves essential, as reconciliation requires grassroots processes engaging ordinary citizens in dialogue and relationship-building rather than merely elite-level political settlements that may lack popular legitimacy or transform daily interactions. Measurement through indices like Rwanda's Reconciliation Barometer enables evidence-based programming by identifying which interventions work and which areas require intensified effort, while also providing accountability by making progress or regression visible to citizens and stakeholders.

5.2 South Africa: Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Its Aftermath

South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which operated from 1996 to 1998 under the moral leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, represented a pioneering attempt to address apartheid-era human rights violations through restorative justice emphasising truth-telling, acknowledgment, and reconciliation rather than purely punitive approaches. The Commission's key features included public hearings providing voice to victims who could testify about violations they suffered, validating their experiences and ensuring their suffering entered the national record rather than being forgotten or denied. Amnesty provisions offered perpetrators relief from prosecution in exchange for full disclosure of politically motivated crimes, based on the premise that truth about what occurred and why served societal reconciliation better than trials that might yield convictions but leave facts obscured. Recommendations for reparations to victims and institutional reforms to prevent recurrence aimed to ensure that reconciliation included material justice and structural change, not merely symbolic gestures. The focus on restorative rather than purely retributive justice reflected ubuntu philosophy emphasising healing of relationships and restoration of social fabric over punishment alone.

However, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, assessments revealed that few of the Commission's recommendations had been implemented and there had been few prosecutions of those who failed to apply for amnesty or were refused amnesty by the Commission (Britannica, 2024). This implementation failure stemmed from multiple causes including the time-bound nature of the Commission which closed before it could monitor or advocate for implementation of its recommendations, insufficient political will to pursue prosecutions or institutional reforms that would implicate powerful actors, and limited resources allocated to reparations leaving many victims feeling that their suffering received symbolic recognition without material compensation.

Critical challenges undermining the Commission's long-term impact included its time-bound mandate which created artificial deadlines that rushed complex reconciliation processes and prevented follow-through on recommendations once the Commission closed. Insufficient reparations to victims created perceptions of incomplete justice, as victims who courageously testified received only modest payments while perpetrators who received amnesty faced no material consequences, generating feelings of betrayal among those who participated in good faith. Limited institutional reform allowed structural inequalities that characterised apartheid to persist in modified forms, as economic power remained concentrated in white hands, spatial segregation continued through de facto residential patterns, and security forces were reformed superficially without deep transformation of institutional culture. Economic inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient worsened in the post-apartheid era, demonstrating that political reconciliation without economic justice leaves fundamental drivers of resentment and conflict unaddressed.

The post-Truth and Reconciliation Commission institutional gap in South Africa carries important lessons for Zimbabwe. South Africa did not establish a permanent successor body to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to continue reconciliation work, monitor implementation of recommendations, or address emerging social cohesion challenges. Consequently, social cohesion challenges persist and in some respects have worsened, including xenophobic violence against African migrants that has claimed dozens of lives in periodic attacks reflecting economic frustrations redirected against vulnerable outsiders, service delivery protests that frequently turn violent reflecting governance deficits and unmet expectations, and economic inequality generating political instability as frustrations with slow pace of economic transformation fuel support for populist movements and undermine faith in democratic institutions.

Lessons from South Africa's experience that inform Zimbabwe's path forward include recognition that time-bound commissions prove insufficient for achieving reconciliation, which requires sustained effort extending beyond initial transitional justice processes to address ongoing grievances, monitor backsliding, and respond to new challenges. Reparations matter profoundly, as symbolic recognition without material justice leaves victims feeling abandoned and can generate cynicism about reconciliation processes perceived as favouring perpetrators who escape consequences. Economic justice is inseparable from peace, as addressing structural inequalities that enable some groups to dominate others economically proves essential for sustainable reconciliation, since economic marginalisation generates ongoing resentment regardless of political rights gained. Institutional continuity is critical, as peacebuilding functions require permanent institutional homes with sustained mandates, budgets, and political backing rather than temporary arrangements that close before work is complete, leaving reconciliation incomplete and vulnerable to reversal.

5.3 Kenya: National Cohesion and Integration Commission

Following the devastating post-election violence of 2007-2008 that displaced 600,000 people, killed over 1,300, and brought Kenya to the brink of state collapse, the government established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission as a permanent statutory body in 2008. This decision reflected recognition that ethnic polarisation and political violence could not be addressed through one-off interventions but required sustained institutional commitment to building cohesion and preventing future violence.

The institutional design established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission as a permanent commission under the National Cohesion and Integration Act, providing statutory authority independent of particular political administrations and protected from arbitrary closure when political enthusiasm for reconciliation wanes. The mandate encompasses facilitating and promoting equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony, and peaceful coexistence among Kenya's diverse ethnic communities, providing broad authority to address both blatant violence and subtler forms of discrimination and exclusion. The Commission possesses powers to investigate and prosecute hate speech and incitement, providing enforcement capacity beyond merely advisory roles and enabling consequences for political leaders and others who fan ethnic tensions for personal gain. Authority to develop and implement programmes for national cohesion enables the Commission to take proactive peacebuilding initiatives rather than merely reacting to crises after violence erupts.

The Commission's programmes address multiple dimensions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The Uwiano Platform for Peace provides early warning systems monitoring conflict indicators across the country and rapid response protocols enabling quick deployment of dialogue facilitators and peace monitors when tensions emerge, preventing escalation to violence. Peace monitors deployed during elections observe potential flashpoints, facilitate dialogue between competing groups, and provide alternative dispute resolution before disagreements escalate, contributing to substantially reduced violence in 2013 and 2017 elections compared to the catastrophe of 2007-2008. Ethnic and race relations audits assess the representativeness of government institutions, private sector companies, and civil society organisations, identifying discrimination patterns and promoting equity. Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms embedded in communities provide locally accessible forums for resolving disputes before they escalate to violence or formal litigation, drawing on both modern mediation techniques and traditional justice systems.

Kenya's Chief Justice Martha Koome noted that most Kenyans resolve their conflicts through Alternative Dispute Resolution including mediation, arbitration, and traditional justice systems, and that the National Cohesion and Integration Commission has supported these mechanisms by recognising that formal justice alone proves insufficient for addressing the relational dimensions of conflict (Kenya Judiciary, 2023). This integration of formal and informal mechanisms reflects conflict sensitivity to Kenya's plural legal culture where customary and religious justice systems retain legitimacy alongside state courts.

Lessons from Kenya's experience that inform Zimbabwe's needs include recognition that early warning systems enable proactive rather than reactive approaches to conflict, identifying tensions before they escalate to violence and enabling preventive interventions far less costly than post-violence recovery. Hybrid mechanisms combining formal and traditional justice systems prove effective in plural societies where different communities relate to different forms of authority and where state institutions alone lack legitimacy or reach. Electoral peacebuilding represents critical investment for countries with histories of election-related violence, as dedicated programmes around voter education, monitoring, dialogue between parties, and rapid response to incidents can prevent the transformation of electoral competition into violent conflict. Legal enforcement capacity including powers to prosecute hate speech and incitement provides necessary complement to dialogue-based approaches, as peacebuilding requires both positive incentives for cooperation and negative consequences for those deliberately stoking violence.

6. Proposal: Establishing a Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board

Drawing on theoretical frameworks of Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity, understanding of Zimbabwe's context including historical grievances and contemporary conflicts like urban transport violence, and international case studies from Rwanda, South Africa, and Kenya, this paper proposes establishment of a Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board under the Office of the President and Cabinet as a permanent successor to the defunct National Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

6.1 Institutional Design

The legal basis for the proposed Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board would be established through a statutory instrument creating a permanent commission with clear legislative authority, budget allocation, and operational independence protected from political interference while maintaining accountability to constitutional governance. Constitutional amendment may prove necessary to institutionalise peacebuilding beyond the sunset clause that ended the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission's mandate, embedding permanent peacebuilding infrastructure in the fundamental law to ensure continuity across political transitions. The Board would report to the Office of the President and Cabinet, signalling that peacebuilding constitutes a top national priority requiring presidential attention and enabling coordination across all government sectors.

Composition of the Board would include nine members appointed through transparent, merit-based processes involving The Corporate Governance Unit vetting to ensure credibility and prevent perception of partisan stacking. Representation would ensure diversity across multiple dimensions including gender balance with at least equal representation of women, ethnic diversity ensuring Shona, Ndebele, and other ethnic communities see themselves reflected, regional representation from all provinces preventing domination by particular areas, age diversity including both elders with historical perspective and younger Zimbabweans who constitute the majority of the population, and expertise spanning conflict resolution, transitional justice, human rights, development, governance, and related fields. Members would serve fixed terms with staggered rotation, ensuring institutional continuity as some members remain while others transition, preventing the wholesale turnover that can erase institutional memory. A professional secretariat would employ full-time staff with expertise in conflict analysis, programme design, monitoring and evaluation, community facilitation, research, and communications, while regional offices aligned with devolved governance structures would ensure presence and responsiveness at provincial and local levels rather than concentration of capacity only in Harare.

The mandate of the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board would encompass six core functions. Mainstreaming peacebuilding across all National Development Strategy 2 programmes and subsequent development strategies would ensure that conflict sensitivity becomes integral to government planning rather than an afterthought, with all major programmes required to demonstrate peace impacts. Early warning and response to conflict risks would provide proactive capacity to detect emerging tensions and intervene before escalation to violence, learning from Kenya's Uwiano Platform success. Reconciliation programming would continue the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission's unfinished work addressing historical grievances including Gukurahundi, political violence, land conflicts, and other sources of division that remain unresolved and vulnerable to manipulation. Social cohesion measurement through development and regular administration of national peace indices would enable evidence-based assessment of whether Zimbabwe is becoming more unified or more divided, providing accountability and informing programme priorities. Conflict-sensitive policy review would ensure that proposed policies and programmes undergo systematic Do No Harm analysis before approval, preventing implementation of initiatives that inadvertently fuel tensions. Coordination of peace architecture would link national, provincial, and local peacebuilding efforts, ensuring coherence between community-level dialogue processes and national policy frameworks.

6.2 Core Functions

The first core function would be conflict sensitivity mainstreaming across government. The Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board would develop and enforce Conflict Sensitivity Guidelines requiring all government ministries, departments, and agencies as well as implementing partners receiving government funding to conduct conflict analysis before programme design, examining dividers and connectors in target communities and assessing how proposed interventions might affect these dynamics. Programmes would be required to assess conflict impact through Do No Harm frameworks, analysing resource transfers and implicit ethical messages and their interaction with local conflict dynamics, ensuring that distribution mechanisms, targeting criteria, and implementation modalities strengthen connectors rather than exacerbating dividers. Quarterly reporting on peacebuilding contributions would make conflict sensitivity a performance indicator for ministries and agencies, requiring them to demonstrate how their programmes contributed to social cohesion and what adaptations were made when conflict risks were identified. Integration of peace indicators into monitoring and evaluation frameworks would ensure that development outcomes are assessed not only in terms of infrastructure completed or services delivered but also in terms of whether programmes brought communities together or drove them apart.

This mainstreaming function addresses the current gap where National Development Strategy 2 references peace aspirationally but lacks mechanisms for operationalisation. Every infrastructure project from road construction to electricity grid expansion, every agricultural programme from input distribution to irrigation development, and every service delivery initiative from health facilities to schools would be required to demonstrate conflict sensitivity analysis and peace contribution. The transport sector conflicts that have claimed lives and destroyed property would have been prevented or mitigated had conflict sensitivity been applied systematically. Conflict analysis would have identified the economic desperation driving informality, regulatory frameworks would have been designed through participatory processes giving operators voice, enforcement would have emphasised dialogue and compliance support rather than punitive raids, and economic alternatives including skills training and microfinance would have been provided for those unable to continue in transport.

The second core function would provide early warning and rapid response capacity. Drawing on Kenya's successful Uwiano Platform model, the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board would establish community-based peace monitors across all ten provinces, recruiting respected community members who can monitor conflict indicators, facilitate dialogue, and alert authorities when tensions emerge. Digital reporting mechanisms accessible via mobile phones would enable real-time reporting of conflict incidents, rumours that could fuel violence, hate speech, or other warning signs, providing the Board with comprehensive situational awareness impossible through official channels alone that often miss community-level dynamics. Interagency rapid response protocols would establish clear procedures for responding to conflict alerts, specifying which agencies take lead responsibility for different types of conflicts and ensuring rapid deployment of dialogue facilitators, mediators, or other peacebuilding resources before tensions escalate to violence. Quarterly conflict risk assessments shared with Cabinet would provide senior government leaders with early warning about emerging tensions, enabling policy adjustments or preventive interventions and ensuring that peacebuilding considerations inform high-level decision-making.

This proactive approach contrasts fundamentally with reactive crisis management that has characterised Zimbabwe's response to conflicts. The transport sector violence would have been detected at early stages through peace monitors reporting increasing tensions at taxi ranks, enabling intervention through dialogue between operators, police, and municipal authorities before violence erupted. Political tensions during electoral periods would be monitored continuously with rapid response when rhetoric becomes inflammatory or isolated incidents threaten to escalate, potentially preventing the cycles of electoral violence that have characterised Zimbabwe's recent history. Resource conflicts over land, water, or mineral rights would be identified early through community monitoring, enabling mediation before positions harden and violence becomes parties' preferred strategy.

The third core function would continue and expand national healing and reconciliation efforts that the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission initiated but could not complete. Community dialogues on historical injustices including Gukurahundi, political violence spanning from the liberation war through post-independence conflicts, land reform and its consequences, and Operation Murambatsvina would provide forums for truth-telling, acknowledgment, and healing that victims require and that society needs to move forward without denial or repeated grievance mobilisation. Victim support programmes would provide psychosocial services recognising that trauma untreated perpetuates across generations, affecting not only direct victims but their families and communities, while also providing material reparations that demonstrate society's recognition of suffering and commitment to redress. Memorialisation processes would honour victims through monuments, commemorative events, and integration into national historical narratives, ensuring that suffering is neither forgotten nor exploited, but acknowledged as part of shared history that all Zimbabweans must understand to prevent recurrence. Traditional justice mechanisms would be integrated with formal processes, recognising that customary authorities retain legitimacy in many communities and that hybrid approaches drawing on both traditional and modern justice systems can prove more effective than either alone, as demonstrated in Rwanda's Gacaca courts and Kenya's Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms.

Research emphasises that reconciliation requires community participation and respect for structures and customs of communities rather than top-down processes that treat citizens as passive recipients.This suggests that the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board's reconciliation programmes must be designed through extensive consultation, implemented through partnerships with community leaders and organisations rather than purely state-driven processes, and adapted to local contexts rather than applying uniform models across Zimbabwe's diverse regions and cultures.

The fourth core function would focus on electoral and political peacebuilding given Zimbabwe's history of election-related violence. The Board would deploy peace monitors during electoral cycles to observe campaign events, monitor potential flashpoints, facilitate dialogue when tensions emerge, and provide rapid response when isolated incidents threaten to escalate, contributing to peaceful electoral processes that strengthen democracy rather than undermining it through violence. Political party dialogue would be facilitated through the Board providing neutral space for parties to negotiate codes of conduct, resolve disputes, and commit publicly to peaceful competition, creating peer pressure for compliance and establishing norms that make violence politically costly. Monitoring of hate speech and incitement with enforcement mechanisms would provide consequences for those who deliberately fan ethnic or political tensions for electoral gain, while distinguishing between legitimate political criticism and dangerous incitement that crosses lines into violence advocacy. Civic education on peaceful political participation would prepare citizens to engage in democratic processes without violence, understanding rights and responsibilities, and providing skills for constructive advocacy and conflict resolution.

The Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board would institutionalise electoral peacebuilding as a permanent function activated during electoral cycles rather than ad hoc responses improvised when violence already threatens, learning from Kenya's experience where institutionalised electoral peacebuilding substantially reduced violence in post-2008 elections.

The fifth core function would establish social cohesion measurement through development and regular administration of a Zimbabwe Peace and Social Cohesion Index measuring multiple indicators of how united or divided the nation is becoming. Trust in institutions would be measured across different demographic groups, assessing whether confidence in government, parliament, courts, police, and other institutions is building or eroding and whether trust levels vary significantly by political affiliation, ethnicity, region, or other identities suggesting differential treatment. Inter-group relations would be assessed measuring attitudes and interactions between political opponents, ethnic communities, urban and rural citizens, and other groups, tracking whether stereotypes and prejudices are softening or hardening and whether collaboration across divides is increasing or decreasing. Perceptions of justice and fairness would measure whether citizens believe the system treats all equally or favours connected elites, whether opportunities are accessible based on merit or require political connections, and whether grievances have legitimate channels for redress. Incidence of violence and conflict would track both major violent incidents and low-level conflicts, identifying trends and hotspots requiring attention. Economic security and equality would be measured recognising that material deprivation and inequality fuel resentment and conflict regardless of political arrangements.

Rwanda's experience demonstrates that measurement enables evidence-based programming and accountability, as the National Unity and Reconciliation Index provided quantitative tracking of reconciliation progress that informed programme priorities and allowed assessment of which interventions worked (NURC, 2020). Zimbabwe's Peace and Social Cohesion Index would provide similar evidence base enabling the Board to demonstrate impact, identify areas requiring intensified effort, and hold government and other actors accountable for contributions to national unity.

The sixth core function would encompass research and knowledge management to ensure that Zimbabwe's peacebuilding efforts build on evidence rather than assumptions. Commissioning research on conflict dynamics would deepen understanding of what drives conflicts, which groups are most affected, what interventions prove effective, and how contexts are changing, providing the analytical foundation for programme design. Documentation of lessons learned and best practices from Zimbabwe's own experience and international comparisons would prevent repeated mistakes while scaling successful approaches, building institutional memory that survives personnel transitions. Development of peace education curricula for schools and communities would ensure that future generations acquire conflict resolution skills, understand dangers of prejudice and dehumanisation, and embrace values of tolerance and inclusion from early ages, preventing recurrence of conflicts that have plagued previous generations. Knowledge exchange with regional and international actors would enable Zimbabwe to learn from others' experiences while contributing Zimbabwe's own lessons to global peacebuilding knowledge, positioning the nation as a thought leader in African peacebuilding.

6.3 Integration with National Development Strategy 2 Priorities

The Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board's work would integrate systematically with each of National Development Strategy 2's ten priorities, ensuring that peacebuilding is not a standalone activity but woven through all development efforts. Priority one on economic transformation and modernisation would be implemented with conflict sensitivity ensuring that economic empowerment programmes reach across political and ethnic divides rather than favouring connected elites, that industrialisation strategies provide employment opportunities distributed equitably across regions preventing concentration that generates regional resentment, and that trade and investment promotion emphasises how economic growth benefits all Zimbabweans rather than narrow constituencies, building support for reforms that might otherwise face resistance.

Priority two on food and nutrition security would integrate peacebuilding through agricultural programmes designed explicitly to strengthen community cooperation through approaches like farmer field schools that bring together diverse participants, water resource management that requires collaborative governance of shared resources creating interdependencies across potential dividers, and land issues addressed through dialogue processes that give voice to all affected parties rather than coercive approaches that generate resentment even among beneficiaries who gain land through processes lacking legitimacy.

Priority three on infrastructure development and utilities would apply conflict sensitivity to infrastructure siting decisions informed by equity and inclusion considerations, ensuring that road networks, electricity grid expansion, water systems, and telecommunications infrastructure serve all regions rather than only politically favoured areas, with employment and procurement from infrastructure projects promoting cross-community integration by requiring contractors to hire and source inputs across ethnic and political lines rather than only from connected networks, and service delivery building state-society trust as citizens experience government delivering tangible improvements in their lives regardless of how they voted, potentially breaking cycles where opposition areas are neglected fuelling further opposition in self-fulfilling prophecies.

Priority four on human capital development through health and education would integrate peacebuilding through health service delivery that reaches all communities equitably, with particular emphasis on marginalised areas where state absence has fuelled perceptions of discrimination, education curricula that incorporate peace education teaching conflict resolution skills and promoting tolerance and inclusion from early ages, and skills development programmes that provide economic alternatives for youth at risk of recruitment into violence whether political, criminal, or extremist.

Priority five on environmental protection and climate resilience would address climate-conflict nexus through interventions recognising that climate change exacerbates resource scarcity potentially triggering violent competition, disaster risk reduction that strengthens community cohesion through collaborative preparedness and response rather than allowing disasters to deepen divisions, and natural resource management designed to prevent conflicts over water, land, grazing, and minerals by establishing transparent, inclusive governance mechanisms for resource allocation.

Priority six on good governance would be strengthened through the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board ensuring that governance reforms promote inclusivity and non-discrimination, that anti-corruption efforts are perceived as genuinely meritocratic rather than selective persecution of political opponents, that devolution empowers local communities while preventing elite capture or majority domination of minorities, and that security sector reform addresses community concerns about police brutality and partisanship as evidenced in transport sector conflicts.

Priority seven on public financial management would integrate peacebuilding through ensuring that budget allocations are perceived as fair across regions and communities, that procurement processes are transparent and prevent favouritism, and that citizens understand how public resources are used building trust in government stewardship. Priority eight on leveraging Information and Communication Technologies would utilise digital platforms for early warning, civic education, and transparent information sharing while preventing misuse for hate speech and disinformation. Priority nine on social protection would ensure that safety nets reach vulnerable groups regardless of political affiliation, preventing perceptions that assistance is reward for partisan loyalty.

 Priority ten on improving Zimbabwe's global image would be enhanced as successful peacebuilding attracts positive international attention, foreign investment, and tourism while reducing risks that conflicts generate negative headlines undermining Zimbabwe's reputation.

This systematic integration operationalises National Development Strategy 2's commitment to strengthen social cohesion through a renewed social contract anchored on trust, dialogue, and shared national values (Government of Zimbabwe, 2025), moving from aspiration to concrete implementation through conflict-sensitive programming across all development sectors.

### 6.4 Resource Requirements and Sustainability

Budget allocation for the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board should be set at 0.5 per cent of the national budget, representing approximately 50 million United States dollars annually based on current budget levels, with this allocation justified by cost-benefit analysis demonstrating that peace dividends substantially exceed investment through increased economic activity, reduced violence costs, greater investor confidence, enhanced tourism, and improved government effectiveness. Additional donor support would be leveraged through the credible institutional framework, as development partners increasingly require conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding components in their assistance, meaning that a strong national peacebuilding institution can attract resources beyond domestic budget allocation. Research on Rwanda demonstrates that peacebuilding investments generate economic returns through increased investment as businesses prefer stable environments, growth in tourism as visitors seek peaceful destinations, and productive capacity as human and financial resources flow into development rather than being consumed by conflict (World Bank, 2023). Conversely, South Africa's experience shows that unaddressed conflict carries significant economic costs through violence including lives lost and property destroyed, instability deterring investment and consumption, and lost opportunities as talents flee conflict zones and potential developments remain unrealised.

Human resources for the Board would include a professional secretariat of approximately one hundred staff distributed across headquarters and provincial offices, bringing expertise in conflict analysis and mediation, programme design and management, monitoring and evaluation, research and knowledge management, communications and civic education, and administration and finance. Community peace monitors numbering approximately one thousand volunteers across all ten provinces would receive stipends and training, providing grassroots presence and community-level conflict detection that professional staff alone cannot achieve. Partnerships with universities would provide research capacity through collaborative studies, student internships, and access to academic expertise in conflict studies, development, governance, and related fields. Collaboration with civil society organisations would enable grassroots reach and programmatic partnerships, recognising that non-governmental organisations possess community relationships and specialised expertise that complement rather than duplicate government capacity.

7. Addressing Potential Challenges

The establishment and effective operation of the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board will face multiple challenges that must be anticipated and addressed through deliberate mitigation strategies.

Resource constraints represent a second major challenge, as competing budget priorities including debt servicing, civil service salaries, and infrastructure may limit funding available for peacebuilding, particularly during economic downturns when budgets contract. Mitigation approaches include demonstrating peace dividends through rigorous economic analysis quantifying costs of conflict and returns on peacebuilding investment, making the case that peacebuilding saves money by preventing expensive conflicts rather than being an expendable luxury. Phased implementation would prioritise high-impact functions like early warning and electoral peacebuilding that can demonstrate quick wins and build political support for expanded programming. Leveraging donor support through government co-financing arrangements where international partners provide technical assistance and programme funding while government maintains institutional infrastructure ensures sustainability beyond donor project cycles. Cost-sharing with private sector actors who benefit from stability including banks, insurance companies, tourism operators, and investors can provide additional resources while building constituencies supporting peacebuilding.

Ethnic and regional tensions represent a second challenge, as peacebuilding efforts may surface suppressed tensions particularly around Gukurahundi and other historical atrocities, with dialogue processes potentially triggering anger and demands for justice that governments may resist. Mitigation requires carefully designed dialogue processes with professional facilitation ensuring safe spaces where pain can be expressed without re-traumatisation or escalation, psychosocial support integrated into reconciliation programming providing counselling and healing services alongside truth-telling, emphasis on forward-looking shared identity alongside addressing past to balance acknowledgment of suffering with vision of common future preventing paralysis in grievance, and learning from Rwanda's experience balancing memory and unity through approaches that neither deny past nor allow it to define identities perpetually.

Coordination complexity represents a third challenge, as coordinating peacebuilding across all government sectors proves administratively complex, requiring engagement with dozens of ministries and agencies each with own cultures, priorities, and resistance to external direction. Mitigation strategies include clear memoranda of understanding with line ministries establishing roles, responsibilities, and processes for conflict sensitivity review and peacebuilding coordination, conflict sensitivity guidelines providing practical tools and templates that reduce burden on ministries by making compliance straightforward rather than requiring expensive consultancies, dedicated focal points in each ministry who receive training and serve as interfaces with the Board ensuring institutional relationships rather than dependence on particular individuals, and quarterly interagency coordination forums bringing together ministries to share experiences, problem-solve collaboratively, and build community of practice around conflict-sensitive development.

Capacity constraints represent a fourth challenge, as conflict analysis, mediation, reconciliation programming, and peace education require specialised skills. Mitigation includes partnerships with regional and international organisations like the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes providing training and technical assistance, university collaborations developing academic programmes in peace and conflict studies creating pipeline of qualified professionals, learning exchange programmes enabling Zimbabwean practitioners to learn from counterparts in Rwanda, Kenya, South Africa and other countries with peacebuilding experience, and gradual capacity building recognising that developing deep expertise requires sustained investment over years not quick fixes.

8. Conclusion and Recommendations

Zimbabwe stands at a critical juncture where the confluence of ambitious development aspirations, institutional vacuum in peacebuilding, deteriorating global peace, and escalating domestic conflicts demands urgent establishment of permanent peacebuilding infrastructure. The National Development Strategy 2 offers a roadmap towards prosperity, but sustainable development proves impossible without sustainable peace, as evidenced by transport sector violence that claims lives, destroys property, and creates pervasive insecurity undermining the economic activity and investor confidence that development requires. The closure of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission in 2024 without functional successor arrangements has created an institutional vacuum precisely when both global instability and domestic conflict dynamics demand strengthened rather than weakened peace architecture.

The deterioration of global peace, with 87 countries becoming less peaceful in 2024 alone, seventeen countries experiencing over 1,000 internal conflict deaths representing the highest number since 1999, and conflict resolution through peace agreements falling from 23 per cent to merely 4 per cent, underscores that peace cannot be taken for granted but requires deliberate institutional investment and sustained effort (Vision of Humanity, 2025; Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024). Zimbabwe cannot afford complacency in this environment of global fragmentation where conflict contagion spreads rapidly and where nations lacking robust peacebuilding capacity find themselves overwhelmed by tensions that escalate faster than improvised responses can address.

This paper has demonstrated that embedding peacebuilding frameworks in political and development programmes is not merely aspirational rhetoric but operationally essential for development effectiveness and national cohesion. The Do No Harm and Conflict Sensitivity frameworks provide practical, proven tools for ensuring that development programmes strengthen rather than undermine social cohesion by systematically analysing dividers and connectors, assessing resource transfers and implicit ethical messages, and adapting programmes based on conflict impact monitoring. Case studies from Rwanda, South Africa, and Kenya offer valuable lessons demonstrating that permanent institutions matter more than time-bound commissions which lack sustained engagement and follow-through, that presidential location signals priority and enables cross-sectoral coordination essential for mainstreaming peacebuilding, that community engagement proves essential as reconciliation requires grassroots processes not merely elite settlements, and that measurement through peace indices enables evidence-based programming and accountability.

 The proposed Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board under the Office of the President and Cabinet would ensure institutional continuity beyond the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission's closure, systematically embed conflict sensitivity across all National Development Strategy 2 priorities through mainstreaming guidelines and review processes, provide early warning and rapid response to conflict risks through community-based monitors and interagency protocols, continue essential national healing and reconciliation work addressing historical grievances that remain unresolved and vulnerable to manipulation, build social cohesion as foundation for inclusive development through programmes promoting inter-group dialogue and cooperation, and measure progress through evidence-based peace indices enabling accountability and adaptive management.

Specific Recommendations

To the Government of Zimbabwe, this paper recommends drafting enabling legislation establishing the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board.

To development partners including United Nations agencies, bilateral donors, and international non-governmental organisations, this paper recommends advocating for transition from the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission to the Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board through technical assistance for institutional design and financial support for initial establishment costs.

To civil society organisations, this paper recommends advocacy for permanent peacebuilding institution through public campaigns, policy briefs, and engagement with parliamentarians ensuring that political leaders face public pressure to prioritise peace infrastructure.

Zimbabwe's journey towards Vision 2030 and upper-middle-income status depends fundamentally on whether development occurs in contexts of peace or conflict, with evidence demonstrating that conflict-affected countries consistently underperform peaceful nations on every development indicator. The choice before Zimbabwe is not between development and peacebuilding but recognition that sustainable development requires embedded peacebuilding as its foundation. The establishment of a Peace, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion Board represents an investment not merely in addressing past conflicts but in building the social foundations for shared prosperity that transcends the divisions of history and creates genuine national unity rooted in justice, equity, and mutual respect.

As the Global Peace Index demonstrates, peace is becoming increasingly scarce globally, with the majority of countries experiencing deterioration rather than improvement in peacefulness (Vision of Humanity, 2025). Zimbabwe has the opportunity to be a regional example, demonstrating that deliberate, institutionalised, and evidence-based peacebuilding can break cycles of conflict and unlock development potential.

Embedding peacebuilding in development is not optional but foundational, representing the essential prerequisite upon which all other development priorities must be built if they are to yield sustainable benefits rather than exacerbating the divisions that have impeded Zimbabwe's progress for too long.

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